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 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
‘Law and political economy’ surveys approaches to the study of phenomena at the 
intersection of law, politics and the economy. It presents real-world events and 
developments in law and political economy through a historical, conceptual and 
interdisciplinary lens, rather than taking law, politics or economics as autonomous 
disciplines, to be studied through pure methods. 
 Law and political economy can be distinguished from classical (or neo-
classical) law and economics because of a focus on issues of power and inequality, 
between persons, groups, states and regions. More specifically, it focuses on how 
relations of power are legally and politically configured and reconfigured over time 
and in distinct periods, and how in turn this conditions the development of the 
economy. While ‘law and political economy’ does not therefore refer to one 
discrete body or system of thought, its treatment here shares an affinity with (and 
owes a debt to) various and related critical traditions.1  
 The aim here will be to sketch in broad outline the themes that have recently 
come to prominence through renewed interest in the political economy and 
politico-legal institutions of capitalist society and its development. This coincides 
with the return in the academy – as well as the public sphere – of a discourse of 
crisis, and specifically structural crises of capitalism, which now demands 
theoretical attention across various disciplines and within mainstream scholarship 
itself (particularly since the global financial crisis and the Euro-crisis beginning in 
2007 - 2008).2 This renewal is thanks, in large part, to the influence of French 
economist Thomas Piketty and German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck. As a 
preliminary step, we first consider the logic of capitalism in terms of a dynamic of 
socio-economic inequality, conditioned by politically and legally constituted 
relations of power, rather than an ‘iron law’ of the capitalist economic system. To 
explore this further, we survey three levels of analysis: law and political economy 
of the market (the micro-level), law and political economy of the state (the meso-
level) and international and global law and political economy (the macro-level). 
This separation, however, is merely heuristic; micro-, meso- and macro-levels are 
of course intertwined and interdependent, not least increasingly mixed through 
forms of transnational integration.3  
 
 
 
                                                      
1 Including Marxism, Keynesianism, the German Historical School of Economics, the Frankfurt School, 
(historical) institutionalism, legal realism, critical legal studies, law and development, and critical political 
economy. 
2 This kind of approach has long been prominent in work on the state in the Marxist tradition, as 
developed, for example, by Bob Jessop (e.g. Jessop, 2017). 
3 This is most evidently in the case of the European Union, which is at the same time an internal market, 
a proto-state (with a central bank and single currency within the Eurozone), and an inter-state trade 
regime. It will not be dealt with separately here but integrated into the entry at various points. 
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II. CAPITALISM AND INEQUALITY 
 
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), a historical approach to 
institutional change and the dynamics of inequality from a longue durée perspective, 
has begun to shape inquiries into the relationship between law and political 
economy and will likely do so for the foreseeable future. According to Piketty and 
associates, the rate of return on capital has consistently outpaced the average 
growth of the economy as a whole and “an apparently small gap between the 
return on capital [ r ] and the rate of growth [ g ] can in the long run have powerful 
and destabilizing effects on the structure and dynamics of social inequality” (2014: 
77).  This ‘law of capitalism’ is expressed in the inequality: r > g (ibid: 353), which 
means that “capital reproduces itself faster than output increases” (ibid: 571). All 
else being equal, this means that unless the process is actively reversed, the rich get 
richer faster than anyone else in society.  
 A central question emerging from Piketty’s work is whether the inequality 
stemming from r > g is to be understood as resembling a ‘natural law’ or as the 
contingent result of political and legal choices. Piketty is ambiguous about this, 
treating inequality as “a historical fact, not a logical necessity” (ibid: 353) but also 
suggesting “that a market economy based on private property, if left to itself… 
contains powerful forces of divergence” (ibid: 571). This divergence (i.e. increasing 
levels of inequality) is clearly observable in the period leading up to World War I 
and again in the last few decades of the 20th century. In attempting to explain the 
anomaly in between (World War I to the 1970’s), analyses of economic trends and 
politico-legal dynamics join forces. There is, however, disagreement on what this 
reveals. In line with the general literature, Piketty describes the period between the 
end of World War II and the beginning of the first oil crisis in 1973 – variously 
called les trente glorieuses, Wirtschaftswunder or the Golden Age of Capitalism – as an 
exceptional one where inequality was contained. But he suggests that the 
‘fundamental structural contradiction of capitalism’ was ameliorated rather than 
overcome. Capitalism, in other words, continued to adhere to its immanent logic, 
independent of the politico-legal framework of society. Its effects were mediated 
by the countervailing forces of redistributive policies and reconstruction in the 
aftermath of the levelling destruction caused by two world wars. This, however, 
only enabled “the illusion that the fundamental structural contradiction of 
capitalism (r > g) had been overcome” (ibid: 572 (italics added)). 
 Scholars of a more institutionalist bent take a different approach. Critical legal 
scholars, for instance, have claimed that capitalism should be understood 
fundamentally as a legal rather than a material ordering (Grewal, 2014: 652). 
Samuel Moyn argues that in order to understand economic inequality, one must 
abandon the idea of a ‘capitalist system’ with certain identifiable general laws and 
tendencies; there are “only legal and more broadly political arrangements in which 
inequality improves or … worsens” (ibid: 54). He concludes that “there is no such 
thing as capitalism” (ibid: 55). The economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. 
Robinson also criticise Piketty’s “quest for general laws of capitalism” (2015: 3) for 
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failing to allow for “a systematic role of institutions and political factors in the 
formation of inequality” (ibid: 4). This failure “implies that [Piketty’s] general laws 
have little explanatory power” (ibid).  
 Wolfgang Streeck offers the kind of perspective that is suggested by an 
institutionalist line of critique. For Streeck, the ‘fundamental insight of political 
economy’ is that “the natural laws of the economy, which appear to exist by virtue 
of their own efficiency, are in reality nothing but projections of social-power 
relations which present themselves ideologically as technical necessities” (Streeck, 
2015a: 10). Streeck takes a broad view, presenting a material dynamic of the whole 
social order that is both capitalist and democratic in form, based on distinct but 
inter-related logics of competition and accumulation on the one hand, and 
solidarity and redistribution on the other. These two logics, which transcend the 
varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2002), operate in a dynamic 
disequilibrium (Streeck, 2011). Nancy Fraser pushes this even further. Capitalism, 
in accordance with its own logic, is parasitical on those very social, political and 
ecological foundations that it tends to erode; but as an institutional, historical and 
moral form of economy it cannot be understood in abstraction from democratic 
forces and the pressures they exert on the governance of the state and the state 
system (Fraser, 2014).  
 Like Piketty and associates, Streeck argues that les trentes glorieuses is part of an 
exceptional period due to the high growth rates achieved in the context of post-
war reconstruction. This growth allowed for the emergence of a compromise 
between capital and labour that facilitated high levels of pre-distribution 
(increasing labour’s share of national income) and redistribution (social transfers). 
But this comes to an end in the revolt of capital that begins the period of neo-
liberalism in the 1970’s, which sees a return to the ‘normal’ dynamic over the 
subsequent decades, “a condition ruled by an endemic conflict between capitalist 
markets and democratic politics” (Streeck, 2011: 6). This in turn entails recurrent 
crises and further economic instability, Streeck presenting the state as moving 
through various developmental stages, as the tension between the democratic and 
capitalist logic is softened or deferred by political and legal means (Streeck, 2014).  
 Streeck’s analysis has rejuvenated enquiry not only into the relation between 
democracy and capitalism but also into the political-legal transformation of the 
state, in particular through the project of European integration, and most recently 
the single currency, the euro. In these conditions, as the dominant means for the 
state to raise resources has shifted from reliance on its citizens through direct 
taxation (the ‘tax state’) to reliance on financial investors in the global marketplace 
(the ‘debt state’), a new type of ‘consolidation state’ is constituted, based on 
perpetual austerity and internal devaluation (Streeck, 2014; see also Scharpf, 2016).  
 Streeck’s work draws on and updates earlier insights of Karl Polanyi (2001). 
In Polanyi’s account the modern nation-state exists and evolves in a dynamic 
relation with the modern market economy. Polanyi traces a ‘double movement’ of 
liberal marketisation followed by social reaction to the disembedding of social 
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relations as it evolved in the 19th and early 20th century. The ‘double movement’ 
represents a dynamic of legally induced and enforced commodification of the 
‘fictitious commodities’ of land, money and labour (disembedding that which must 
remain embedded in ‘thick’ social structures), which produces a reaction, as society 
tries to protect itself. Reversing the classical liberal idea, this leads Polanyi (2001: 
147) to the conclusion that “laissez-faire was planned; planning was not.” Social 
re-embedding, in other words, is more likely to be spontaneous than the carefully 
planned and state-executed processes of commodification that preceded it.  The 
existence of two distinct logics in perpetual tension, one operating according to 
notions of equality and solidarity, the other on the basis of inequality and 
competition, is captured by the figure of the ‘market society’. 
 
 
III. LAW, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE MARKET 
 
One of the major limitations of the neo-classical approach to law and economics is 
captured in the notion of ‘markets left to themselves’. This reflects the common 
but misleading perception that markets function according to natural forces or 
natural laws that public power can choose to act upon or withdraw from. But 
markets do not perform a structuring function in society without a legal and 
political ordering already in place. At a minimum, public powers provide the legal 
and material framework conditions within which the economy operates. And this 
minimal-state perspective needs to be complemented to take into account the 
detailed ways in which law and political authority condition and affect market 
relations, transactions and outcomes in practice and in distinct periods (Desautels-
Stein, 2015).  
 The free market paradigm is difficult to align with the legal nature of even 
textbook examples of ‘perfectly competitive’ markets. As Bernard Harcourt (2011: 
15) has demonstrated with reference to the wheat market in Chicago, the 
supposedly most perfectly competitive ‘free markets’ are shot through with 
disciplinary rules and regulations. There is, one might conclude, no such thing as a 
‘self-regulating market’ in which resources are allocated to their most efficient use 
through the free workings of the price mechanism. ‘De-regulation’ and ‘self-
regulation’ are simply names for particular kinds of regulatory and disciplinary 
regimes (see also Vogel, 2018). As Polanyi (2001: 71) put it, “regulation and 
markets, in effect, grew up together.” In other words, the analyst should recognise 
that law and politics structure economic activity both in their absence and in their 
presence. The most salient question is therefore not whether but how law and 
politics shape market activities.  
 The link between the governing apparatus of the state and supposedly ‘free’ 
private economic interactions has long been a central concern for critical legal 
scholars. In order to highlight the constitutive dimension of law for economic life, 
Duncan Kennedy (1991), for example, analysed the way in which society’s 
background rules affect and condition bargaining over supposedly free contracts. 
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When there is a conflict between labour and capital, for instance, distributive 
bargaining does not take place in a legal vacuum, even though the resulting 
contract is presented as the product of voluntary exchanges. As Kennedy puts it, 
“legislators and judges are responsible for the framework of ground rules within 
which labor conflict is conducted, including such basic rules as that corporations 
can “own” factories” (1991: 329). Echoing this, the régulation theorist Robert Boyer 
(2001: 57) has argued that “[t]here is no invisible hand in the implementation and 
selection of basic capitalist institutions” such as property rights. A market 
economy “requires strong and coherent intervention from political authorities, as 
well as a stable legal system” (ibid.).   
 The importance of such fundamental background rules as those which 
constitute property rights is not only that they configure the basic conditions in 
which the parties engage with each other, but that they affect their relative 
bargaining strength, making certain ‘free’ outcomes more or less likely. In this 
respect, Kennedy (1991: 330) outlines two general categories: “the rules governing 
the conduct of parties during bargaining” and “the set of rules that structure the 
alternatives to remaining in the bargaining situation.” The legal framework that the 
state guarantees, in other words, not only acts directly on the particular bargaining 
situation by making it feasible and, subject to certain requirements, binding, but it 
also configures the range of possible alternatives and the likelihood of their 
materialisation in practice.   
 In addition to the positive law and framework of rules on property and 
contract, the background political and legal culture also shapes economic 
interactions. This can affect concrete inter-personal relations in fundamental but 
complex, and often hidden, ways, conditioning relations of social reproduction, 
including workplace and household relations, gender and race relations, inter-
generational relations, etc. The politico-legal ‘background rules’ of a regime 
structure the way people lead their lives and the relations they enjoy with one 
another in the public sphere, the ‘in between’ sphere of civil society and the 
private sphere of the home. Rules regarding parental leave, for instance, influence 
the pay gap between men and women, which in turn leads to a given distribution 
of bargaining power within the family (also a legal category with economic 
consequences), concerning issues ranging from household duties to career 
opportunities. As feminist theory and activism has been propelled into public 
consciousness, the line between the personal and the political in increasingly 
contested. This is no less true of the personal and the economic. In order to 
understand how a formally free and equal market economy (re-)produces 
inequalities, one must thus recognise that “the mundane matters” (Enloe 2011).  
 The relation between the politico-legal order that produces a certain kind of 
market economy and the social power relations in the household or firm is central 
to the law and political economy perspective on what we have called here the 
‘micro-level’. It requires the analyst to adopt a relational perspective on power that 
sees it not merely as possession but something that is “exercised from 
 
 
Michael A. Wilkinson and Hjalte Lokdam                             Law and Political Economy 
 
 7 
innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile forces” 
(Foucault, 1990: 94). From this vantage point the analyst must not only take into 
consideration that the legal and political structure of the capitalist economy 
produces inequalities but also consider what different forms these inequalities take 
and how they change over time. Struggles against dominant interests and ideas in 
turn take their point of departure from everyday experiences of distributive 
injustice, misrecognition and the absence of political representation, and can 
translate into calls for reform of the politico-legal structuring of the economy (e.g. 
Fraser, 2013; Brown, 2015).  
 
 
IV. LAW, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE STATE 
 
The state and the state-system continue to be key focal points for law and political 
economy. The state remains a primary locus of political allegiance and continues 
to provide the main stage for ideological, distributive, and identity conflicts and 
struggles. As such, it is central to understanding the relations between law, politics 
and the economy as they evolve in the context of a specific and dominant form of 
actually existing political community.  
 Under the Bretton Woods system, individual states took on an active role in 
the economy, conditioning the ‘free labour market’ through political and legal 
means. Whether through nationalisation of key industries, Keynesian demand 
management, or the introduction and extension of social rights based on 
citizenship (Marshall, 1950), politico-legal institutions of the state directly shaped 
economic outcomes, transforming the ‘background’ conditions by affecting the 
relative bargaining strength of employers and employees. The development of the 
welfare state is crucial in this respect, offering a means of subsistence irrespective 
of employment status. Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) shows that the relative 
bargaining position is fundamentally altered if workers have a meaningful, non-
stigmatising, opportunity of opting out of the labour market for an extended 
period of time. For Esping-Andersen the welfare state is a recognition of the fact 
that there is no free and equal bargaining position between labour and capital. The 
worker cannot meaningfully withdraw her labour power for any length of time 
without this resulting in significant material deprivation. In addition to its general 
macroeconomic effects on post-redistributive income equality, the welfare state 
thereby fundamentally alters the pre-redistributive income distribution through 
providing the worker with an alternative to accepting the wage offered by 
employers.  
 The tradition of German ordoliberalism offers a very different complexion on 
the relationship between the state and the market. Ordoliberalism rejects both the 
notion of laissez-faire of 19th century classical liberalism and the central planning 
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associated with socialism and the welfare state.4 The ordoliberals thus sought a 
‘third way’, which privileged the role of the state and the constitution in the 
ordering of the economy (for a collection of key ordoliberal texts, see Peacock and 
Willgerodt, 1989). But rather than necessarily distorting the functioning of the 
market economy, as classical liberalism complained, or tempering capitalist 
inequality, as welfarism demanded, the ordoliberals considered state intervention 
in the economy to be necessary in order to preserve the free market itself. The 
state, as it were, needed to remain in a position akin to a neutral but proactive 
umpire: free of the influence of interest groups, parties and mass democracy 
(Manow, 2001), but strong enough to able to prevent any socio-economic group 
from becoming dominant and distorting the political-economic structure. The 
state’s role, in other words, was to ensure that there remained indeed something 
resembling the theoretical ‘free market position.’  
 The ordoliberal rejection of a self-regulating market is encapsulated in the 
doctrine of the ‘strong state in a free economy’ (Bonefeld, 2017). The state 
provides the basic ‘order’ of the economy and remains an active force, but only in 
accordance with the principles of the market, functioning as ‘guardian of the 
competitive order’ (Eucken, 2004). This also requires the market economy to be 
protected from electoral take-over, shielding the apparatus of economic 
governance from political forces hostile to it. Political and economic power 
should, thus, be strictly circumscribed through an ‘economic constitution’ policed 
by strong independent institutions, such as a constitutional court, an anti-trust 
commission and a legally independent central bank, which developed in the post-
war period as a model for removing the government of money from democratic 
influence. In this sense, ordoliberal ideas provided the economic dimension of 
what Jan-Werner Müller (2011) has called ‘constrained democracy.’ In tandem 
with the protection of certain basic elements of the ‘political’ constitutional order 
against potentially non-liberal democratic majorities, West Germany developed an 
apparatus of economic government that isolated aspects of economic policy from 
electoral politics – and long before neoliberalism emerged in the form we know it 
today.  
 While ordoliberalism shares a number of convictions with the American 
neoliberalism associated with ‘the Chicago School’ – particularly a conception of 
freedom that privileges the market, the homo economicus, as well as a dedication to 
the stability of money – they also differ on crucial issues. One such issue is the 
question of monopoly power. Ordoliberalism sees private monopolies as an evil 
justifying state intervention. To neoliberals such as Milton Friedman (1962: 28), 
however, “if tolerable, private monopoly may be the least of the evils,” compared 
with the other ‘evils’ of public monopoly and public regulation. What makes 
private monopolies “tolerable” is the belief, following Schumpeter’s famous 
                                                      
4 To the ordoliberals, Keynesianism was essentially a variant of socialism. In this they shared Hayek’s 
conception that the ‘road to serfdom’ was paved by economic planning.  
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notion of ‘creative destruction,’ that, absent government interventions, the market 
will, in the long run, erode monopoly power. In a free market economy, monopoly 
is therefore perceived only as a temporary competitive advantage bound to be 
eroded over time by new entrants and technologies, or kept in check by the threat 
of such.  
 A neoliberal faith in the market mechanism has, since the late 1970s, largely 
eclipsed earlier welfarist and also, to an extent, ordoliberal ideas. This development 
is reflected in a commitment to the well-known policy mix of privatisation, 
deregulation and liberalisation. The neoliberal state might, for instance, promote 
distribution through prices rather than through hierarchies, political objectives or 
social needs, or it might encourage various forms of ‘self-regulation,’ leaving, 
within new institutional settings, non-public actors to innovate and devise 
guidelines for economic activity. It does not, however, mean that the neoliberal 
state withdraws from the market or that it is a small state. On the contrary, the 
neoliberal state actively restructures and reregulates the functioning of the 
economy along ideological lines and in favour of the interests of capital (Harvey, 
2007). 
 The legal-political institutions of the state thus play a crucial role in 
neoliberalism. Their function and form, however, change. Rather than ordering 
and correcting economic relations through maintaining competitive markets or 
protecting labour unions and welfare policies, the state emerges as a key actor in 
pursuing market liberal economics, weakening the position of labour relative to 
capital, and, in particular, directing the turn to financialisation of the economy 
(Mahmud, 2015). This takes place through domestic reforms as well as imperialist 
strategies and international integration (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2017).  
 
 
V. LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AND 
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 
 
Perhaps the most significant development in law and political economy over the 
last few decades has been the internationalisation of trade and production and the 
liberalisation of financial markets. This may be defended from an economically 
liberal perspective as facilitating consumer choice and exposing previously 
monopolistic firms in the domestic economy to competition. Economic 
globalisation, however, also has the effect of curbing the power of organised 
labour. When the political and legal structure allows production to be offshored or 
outsourced more easily, the ability of workers to demand a higher share of profits 
declines. Even without taking policies directly targeting the power of trade unions 
into account, globalisation thereby has the effect of strengthening the alternatives 
for capital. In that sense, the neoliberal revolution of Thatcher, Reagan and others 
started in the late 1970s can be interpreted as a restoration of the class power of 
capital, which had been gradually curbed during the post-war period of Keynesian 
demand management and full employment policies (Duménil and Lévy, 2004, 
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Harvey, 2007, Streeck, 2014).5 The pattern of rising inequality that Piketty 
describes appears to have started in tandem with the adoption of neoliberal 
policies on a grand scale, ushering in a political-economic paradigm that remained 
virtually unchallenged until the financial crisis of the late 2000s. While some 
scholars have made compelling arguments about the need to disaggregate the 
macro figures of inequality and look at differing national level explanations for 
economic developments (see Acemoglu and Jameson, 2015), it remains notable 
that inequality has increased across all but a few OECD countries (OECD, 2015) 
and there are indications that inequality is increasing even in developing 
economies such as China (Cevik and Correa-Caro, 2015) and India (Chauhan et al, 
2016).   
 Discourses of internationalisation and globalisation also reflect the fact that 
economic activity and its externalities increasingly cross borders. Climate change is 
perhaps the most obvious example, but the effects of finance, trade, production, 
and the movement of labour and capital have led to the realisation that “in an ever 
more integrated world economy … national capacities to provide such collective 
goods as market regulation or crisis management have been dramatically 
weakened” (Underhill and Zhang, 2008: 536). A complex matrix of legal and 
political institutions beyond the state has also emerged. International and regional 
organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank, WTO, EU, Mercosur and 
NAFTA structure trade and economic integration and address the problems that 
flow from it. Such organisations have fundamentally altered global political-
economic relations between and within certain states by facilitating and routinising 
cooperation and relatively peaceful dispute resolution. But more than simply being 
agents for states to overcome collective action problems, international 
organisations have become actors in their own right. Whether as participants in 
the construction and perpetuation of policy regimes “around which actor 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Ruggie, 1982: 
380), through exercising bureaucratic expert authority (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004), or through legal regimes and regulation (Shapiro and Stone Sweet, 2002), 
international organisations serve to disseminate ideas for institutional reform in 
the national context. Domestic politics and law-making are often conditioned by 
international rules and norms that are outside the individual state’s capacity to alter 
unilaterally. As has been shown in the context of regional integration in the 
European Union, constitutional structures of supranational authority and 
integration through law may have a profound effect on political economy through 
their deregulatory bias (Scharpf, 2010).  
 Processes of international and global integration, even if infrequently 
contested under normal political circumstances, can spring into full view at certain 
critical moments, as in the case of the recent financial crisis. With international 
                                                      
5 Whether this would have been successful without the entry of China into the world economy, with its 
vast ‘reserve army’ of labour, is another matter (Harvey 2007). 
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financial markets as well as states and supranational institutions committed to 
preserving market integration and the economic status quo, the fundamental 
politico-legal sovereignty of an individual state may be increasingly eroded 
(Loughlin, 2016). Democracy and even legality may appear to be sacrificed on the 
altar of market imperatives by an authoritarian liberalism entrenched in a 
governmental apparatus and backed by the interests of capital, personified in the 
Euro-crisis by the so-called ‘Troika’ (ECB, European Commission and IMF) (see 
Streeck, 2014, 2015b; Wilkinson, 2015).  
 The study of law and political economy must therefore consider the politico-
legal implications of democratic states being deprived of policy autonomy through 
their involvement in projects of economic integration. With the introduction of 
the euro, for example, national institutions that developed historically through 
conflicts and compromises between different societal actors are subsumed under a 
legal-technical monetary regime associated with a particular form of capital 
accumulation. The monetary order, in other words, is far from politically neutral; it 
is linked to a more comprehensive institutional ordering of the economy (Matthijs 
and Blyth, 2015). On this question, recent work on the Eurozone suggests that in 
order to compete with capital, democracy may require a reclaiming of political 
sovereignty over monetary powers (Streeck, 2015a: 13). This approach emphasises 
the potential and actual conflicts between a supranational legal order and the 
existing institutionalised mediations of the relations between society and the 
capitalist economy. It illustrates what the economist Dani Rodrik (2011: xviii) has 
called the “fundamental political trilemma of the world economy: we cannot 
simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, and economic 
globalization.” Against the reassertion of national popular sovereignty, some, most 
notably in Europe (Hennette et al, 2017), seek an up-scaling of democracy, 
proposing to reunite democracy and economic integration at the supra-national 
level. So far, however, it would appear that the stubbornness of the state-system 
acts as a strong, perhaps insurmountable, obstacle to this vision of democratic 
self-government beyond the state. National democratic retrenchment may appear 
as the more feasible alternative, reclaiming state sovereignty advocated as a project 
of progressive social and economic change for a post-neoliberal era (Mitchell and 
Fazi, 2017).   
 Even if the state were formally to regain sovereignty, however, the ability to 
exercise it effectively would be constrained by its need to retain and attract 
investments and finance. There is a parallel between the situation of the individual 
person and the individual state: both ‘enter’ (or re-enter) a space of action where 
political-economic agency is conditioned by existing ground rules and concrete 
power relations. As Charles Lindblom (1982) put it, in a capitalist world economy, 
markets come with automatic punishment mechanisms. Given the capacity of 
capital to halt production and investment or move it elsewhere, the consequences 
of a significant political or economic reform may be prohibitive in terms of 
economic stagnation and unemployment. As such, governments may be reluctant 
to even consider certain political and economic reforms. The erosion of state 
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authority is thus also linked to the increasing power of capital in the form of 
transnational corporations (TNCs). More than simply being rule-takers, TNCs 
increasingly structure and constrain legal-political action within state jurisdictions. 
Whether on trade standards, value chains, the regulation of externalities, control of 
information and production, or the formulation of international regulatory 
regimes, states lose control over economic processes, even if – unilaterally or 
collectively – they set this dynamic in motion in the first place (Helleiner, 1994). 
Law and political economy thus calls attention to the need to critically examine the 
dynamic between legal provisions that alter existing power relations and how such 
power relations already condition the scope of feasible political and legal change. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The recent surge in interest in critical approaches to the study of law, politics, and 
the economy finds expression in the rejection of economistic explanations of 
everything from climate change to family structures, and to expressions of 
democratic sovereignty. While ‘political economy’ as a discipline and way of 
thinking has a long history associated with some of the great Western thinkers of 
the 18th and 19th centuries (e.g. the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, 
Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx), the recent interest stems from a 
renewed conviction that political, juridical and economic processes cannot be 
understood in any meaningful way as autonomous.  
 Political decision-making and law-making doesn’t take place in a social or 
economic vacuum, even though the material conditions of the day are to many 
policy makers often considered a given. The question of whether to maintain or 
abandon a capitalist market economy, for instance, is only rarely a salient political 
question. More commonly the question would take the form: what kind of 
capitalist market economy do we want to have? Most of the time it is thus 
forgotten that the economy is a capitalist economy, which can be presumed 
neither neutral nor natural. In interstitial periods, when it is again remembered that 
the economy is a juridico-political construction, as well as a product of the power 
relations of social classes, genders, races, national interests, and other social 
struggles (core - periphery, creditor - debtor, land owners - city dwellers, capital - 
labour, workers - non-workers), the deeper question of the material role of 
structure and agency returns. Through analyses that capture the nature and 
dynamics of these relations, it may be possible to attain a fuller self-understanding 
of law and political economy in modern society. 
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